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PANEL DISCUSSION: SECURITIES LAW QUESTIONS
AND COMMENTS ON THE COMPARISON OF
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAWS IN MEXICO AND
THE UNITED STATES
MODERATOR: JOHN M. STEPHENSON, JR.*
PANEL MEMBERS: ROBERT L. KIMBALL,**
ANDRES V. GIL,*** IGNACIO GOMEZ-PALACIO****
Robert Kimball: I want to comment on the importance of having
Mexican counsel involved in transactions of U.S. companies in Mexico.
The more I read the descriptions of securities for Mexican companies,
the more they remind me of something straight out of an S-1 Registration
Statement for an initial public offering of a Delaware corporation. This
concerns me, because I doubt the accuracy of some statements.
Let me illustrate. In Delaware, a preferred dividend is fixed. When
people in the U.S. talk about a preferred dividend, they usually mean
that holders get seven percent of their original investment. After that,
they do not share in the distribution of corporate earnings. In Mexico,
my understanding is that the preferred shareholder usually receives a
fixed preferred dividend and shares pro rata with the common stock in
the distribution of earnings. It is an important difference for valuation
purposes.
Another difference exists for liquidation preferences. The liquidation
preference in a Delaware company is typically limited to the dollar amount
of the fixed preferential distribution before a distribution is made to the
common stockholder upon liquidation. Under Mexico's Ley Mercantil,
the preferred shareholder gets the preferred distribution and then shares
pro rata with the common stockholder in the assets upon liquidation.
This is similar to the sharing of dividends. One Mexican authority says
that under the bylaws, one can limit that to a thirty percent participation,
but no other authority states that. Under Delaware law, a company may
authorize preferred shareholders to participate pro rata in corporate
earnings after payment of preferred dividends.
These are examples of important financial terms where one may not
have as much flexibility in Mexico as in Delaware. At least it demonstrates
that United States attorneys need to consult with Mexican counsel about
the enforceability of particular Mexican provisions.
Registration rights agreements are also interesting. Stockholder agreements are common in the United States, but the rules governing such
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agreements need to be incorporated in the bylaws of Mexican corporations.
In U.S. venture capital transactions, it is common for the venture capitalist
to either ask for a right to register the securities at a specified time so
that they can be resold at public market or ask for a right to "piggyback" off the registration of the company at an initial public offering.
This is done so that when the company first sells its securities to the
public, the joint venturers have a right to participate with some percentage
of their stock and have it sold at public market. Registration rights
agreements are not well known in Mexico. The enforceability of such
agreements is subject to substantial uncertainty, especially because those
agreements are not typically included in Mexican corporate bylaws.
There are also differences in the rights of stockholders versus those
of directors. Stockholders in Mexico must participate in deciding money
matters, which, in the U.S., is normally deferred to the board of directors.
Shareholders in the U.S. may authorize directors to determine the terms
of "blank check" preferred stock of U.S. corporations. In Mexico,
determination of securities terms must be approved at a common stockholders meeting. Thus, when U.S. lawyers are dealing with Mexican
securities, they should make sure that Mexican lawyers are looking at
the terms of the securities and passing on them, as well as a disclosure
about them. Very often U.S. lawyers get the right advice from Mexican
counsel on the bylaws and then write the disclosure statement as though
the securities were issued by a Delaware corporation.
Ignacio Gdmez-Palacio:Another feature of the Mexican Company Law,
which is a subject of some confusion, is the S.A. (Sociedad Anonima)
versus the S.R.L. (Socieded de Responsibilidad Limitada). In the United
States, corporations and partnerships are used all the time. In Mexico,
that is not the case. All we have are S.A.s.
Under the Mexican Company Law, U.S. and Canadian lawyers will
wonder whether they should incorporate a business as a corporation, a
S.A., or should establish a partnership, a S.R.L. One of the most
important differences between S.A.s and S.R.L.s is that the corporation
or S.A. has shares of stock (acciones) and the S.R.L. has social parts
(partes sociales), which is not a negotiable instrument like acciones. A
S.R.L. is not an. instrument registered in one's name which could be
endorsed. The S.R.L. does not have stockholders and stockholders' meetings; it has partners and partners' meetings. A S.R.L. is usually appropriate for a personal business and cannot be used for a public offering.
The S.R.L. has a maximum of fifty partners. Finally, the social parts
of a S.R.L. are worth one Mexican peso, or multiples of a peso. The
minimum capital for a S.R.L. in 1994 is 3,000 pesos, which is roughly
U.S. $900. The minimum to incorporate a S.A. is 50,000 pesos, which
translates into about U.S. $15,000 in 1994.
In Mexico, a company is a contract. Therefore, one needs at least two
stockholders or two partners to form the business entity. Mexico does
not recognize solely-owned corporations or partnerships. Thus, some rights
for a Mexican company are going to be stricter, such as, rights of first
refusal when a partner wants to sell his partes sociales.
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Both the S.A. and S.R.L. have another important feature called the
comisario, which is a corporate official who checks on the management
in the interest of the stockholders or partners. A comisario is not the
same as an auditor. A comisario is appointed by the stockholders or
partners to oversee the acts of the board of directors. The word comisario
should be translated as "inspector," "marshal" or "deputy".
The position of a comisario should be occupied by a lawyer, because
a lawyer possesses the requisite knowledge to call attention to illicit acts,
such as infringement of trademarks or failure to comply with consumer
protection laws. A lawyer should also possess a knowledge of financial
reporting. In Mexico, however, accountants typically occupy this position.
Additionally, a comisario carries a tremendous amount of potential liability because their function is to call attention to any failure to comply
with laws and regulations. The comisario must carefully look at the acts
of board of directors and management and look at reports by the corporate
management. Thus, accounting firms actually perform the external audit
of a company. This is a distinctive feature of the Mexican Company
Law.
Frank Gill: What is the difference between a Sociedad Anonima and
a Sociedad Anonima de Capital Variable (S.A. de C.V.)?
Gdmez-Palacio: Many companies in Mexico are U.S. subsidiaries and
are not interested in Mexican financing. U.S. subsidiaries want to have
the flexibility of increasing or reducing capital easily. Thus, if a company
organizes as a variable capital company, one can always put nothing in
C.V. In other words, one can have a S.A. de C.V. with a fixed sum
and nothing in a C.V.
Mont Hoyt: For tax reasons in the United States, most U.S. corporations
in Mexico prefer to create a U.S. tax partnership and use a Sociedad
de ResponsibilidadLimitada, a limited liability company, instead of using
a Sociedad de Responsibilidad. Mexican attorneys, however, strongly discourage this.
Miguel Jauregui: It is possible to meet the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service tax requirements with a S.R.L., if certain criteria are met. A
commercial company with limited liability may serve as a partnership for
tax purposes, allowing for investors to avoid double taxation such that
investors will pay a Mexican tax and can use that payment as a credit
on their U.S. tax obligations. That is really the purpose of the S.R.L.
John Stephenson: How is a S.R.L. taxed under the Mexican tax system?
Is there a tax on a S.R.L. itself or do the individual members of a
S.R.L. pay the tax?
Jauregui: Under Mexican law, the S.R.L. is a taxable entity by itself.
For U.S. tax purposes, a S.R.L. is a partnership; but for Mexican tax
purposes, it is a company paying corporate tax. In Mexico, a S.R.L. is
a legal vehicle that has limited liability and looks and acts like a corporate
entity.
Stephenson: The U.S. taxpayer ordinarily is seeking to have the best
of both worlds: treatment as a corporation to limit personal liability in
case of corporate bankruptcy or tort liability and treatment that a part-

U.S.-MEXICO

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

nership undergoes to avoid payment of the U.S. corporate income tax
before distribution of earnings to an owner, a distribution which is subject
to U.S. personal income tax.
Bill Kryzda: There is a four-step test under U.S. tax law where the
S.R.L. in Mexico qualifies as a corporation, but is nevertheless entitled
to the tax benefits of a partnership.
Stephenson: The tests are: limited liability, lack of transferability,
centralization of management and unlimited duration. You only need to
violate two of the four tests to get the treatment in Mexico as a partnership. The S.R.L., however, must be dissolved upon the occurrence
of certain specified events to get partnership tax treatment. The S.R.L.
can be prepared so that it lacks two or three of the characteristics of
.
a corporation ar-d still meet the U.S. tax test.
I have a further concern. Is it possible to have sharing arrangements
written into the bylaws of a S.R.L. under Mexican law which are different
from participation or ownership shares in capital investments?
Abdon Herndndez: Sharing arrangements are governed by Article 16
of the Mexican Company Law. In addition, Article 17 states that any
stipulations excluding one or more associates from participation in the
profits shall have no legal effect whatsoever. Therefore, for each peso
contributed per share, one shares equally with other associates. One is
then entitled to the same rights and voting privileges. Theoretically, that
means that one could build in, at least in the case of a limitada, special
arrangements.
G6mez-Palacio: But that is only for dividends, not voting rights.
Basically, there are corporate rights and patrimonial rights and there is
a distinction between them.
Robert Rendell: I would like to address a different topic. Assume that
a U.S. company has 100% control of proposed activities in Mexico and
finds that the Mexican Company Law is very burdensome or archaic.
What is the possibility for setting up a branch of a Delaware corporation
and doing business in Mexico through that branch?
Jauregui: Historically, branches have not been popular vehicles for
doing business in Mexico, because they were not able to give Mexicans
more than a 50% ownership and they were discouraged by the government.
The Regulations of 1989, however, permitted formation of entities similar
to a branch, offices of representation with income.
Two trends have developed regarding branches. One trend, the 1993
Foreign Investment Law, now regulates the establishment of branches.
The other trend is that taxing authorities now are specifically regulating
the taxation of income of these branches. Although a U.S. corporation
may avoid going through the Mexican Company Law by having a branch
registered in Mexico, one must then consider how will a branch be taxed,
either as a S.R.L. or a S.A. de C.V.?
Michael Gordon: Assume that a U.S. corporation registers a branch
in Mexico but runs into some difficulty. Will a Mexican court apply the
law of the state of incorporation, which would be Delaware, or would
the court apply the Mexican Company Law to this enterprise doing
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business in Mexico? I would assume the issue would depend on what
the matter is and whether Mexico considers that particular matter to be
of special interest to the Mexican public to apply the Mexican Company
Law rather than the provisions of the Delaware law.
G6mez-Palacio: If the issue was to supply products to a corporation
of the Mexican government and a power of attorney was issued by a
Delaware company, I would imagine that Mexican courts would apply
Delaware law to determine whether that power of attorney was ineffective.
Gordon: What if there is an external agreement among shareholders
of the Delaware corporation, recognized as valid by Delaware law, would
the Mexican court recognize the legitimacy of the shareholders' agreement?
G6mez-Palacio: Yes, because the court should apply Delaware law
unless the agreement is found to be against public policy of Mexico. I
would not imagine that a regulation of a Delaware law allowing stockholders' agreements would be considered against the national interests
of Mexico.

